

Dr. George Moraes, Bombay

ON the appearance of the Mughal army in Goa under the command of Shah Alam, the eldest son of Aurangzeb, Sambhaji, who had invaded Goa in force and was jubilantly waiting for the fall of the city, promptly raised the siege and dispatched his ambassadors post-haste to treat with the Viceroy.* He also prevailed upon the rebel Prince Akbar, who on the collapse of his insurrection against Aurangzeb, his father, had found asylum at the Maratha court, to intercede for him with the Portuguese. Conde de Alvor consented to make peace with the Marathas and deputed Manuel Saraiva de Albuquerque as his envoy to settle the terms of the treaty personally with Sambhaji and his ministers.

Sambhaji undertook to restore to the Portuguese all the forts and fortifications which he had taken from them along with the artillery and arms, and whatsoever Portuguese vessels his ministers and subedars may have seized before or after the war together with their cargo. In return the Portuguese agreed to restore the ships of any of Sambhaji's subjects captured by them, and not to permit the Mughal ships to sail under their guns with provisions to the armies of the Great Mughal. They also assured that the 'gão de candil' of the jurisdiction of Bassein would be remitted regularly to the Marathas as also the Chouto of Damão in the very form in which it had been paid to King Chouthia, the Marathas on their part taking upon themselves the duty of defending these possessions from external aggression. It was also stipulated that the prisoners taken by either side should be released, that commerce should be untrammelled allowing free passage to the subjects of one state to pass into the other with their goods and merchandise; and that amity should endure between the two states in the future.¹

Unhappily, however, the peace lasted only for the duration of the Mughal campaign. For with the withdrawal of the Mughal troops from

1. *Cartas Patentes e Alvaras*, No. 66 fl. (?), cited in Panduranga S. S. Pissurlencar, *Portugueses e Marathas*, BIVG, 1921, No. 2, p. 91.

1^a. Panduranga S. S. Pissurlencar, *Antiguidades: Estudos e Documentos sobre a História dos Portugueses na Índia* (Bastora, Tipografia Rangel, 1941), vol. I, Fas. I, pp. 82 and 85 (Letters of the Viceroy and the Secretary of State to the ambassador dated 17th and 28th April, 1684 respectively. The dates are all in the new style).

the Konkan in March 1684 Sambhaji showed himself unwilling to carry out the terms of the treaty. He would not withdraw his troops from the Portuguese territories in North Konkan, nor free the prisoners he had taken to Bhimgad from Goa (Bardes). He would not dismantle the fortifications he had built at Kolla, nor restore the artillery taken from Bardes. In point of fact the Marathas were as aggressive as they were before concluding the treaty. And already in March the Maratha fleet had in an encounter with a Portuguese convoy captured some of the ships and parangas laden with rice and other provisions which they were bringing to Goa from Kanara.² Consequently, with a view to settle these and other outstanding questions the Viceroy dispatched Father Antonio de São Joseph, an Augustinian friar, as his ambassador to the Maratha court. The ambassador was accompanied among others by Antonio Alvares Themudo, evidently a Portuguese, and Ramachandra Naik, a trusted Hindu officer in the Portuguese diplomatic service, who had intimate 'knowledge of the treaties concluded between the two states,' and who was personally acquainted with Prince Akbar and Kavi Kalash,³ Shambhaji's favourite.

The embassy left Goa towards the end of March 1684, reaching first Patgão and then Raigad, where Sambhaji lived at the time. In their instructions to the ambassador, both the Viceroy and the Secretary of State had anticipated all the charges and allegations that could be advanced by the opposite party, and had equipped him with appropriate replies. The question was sure to be raised about the forced conversion of the Hindus which had been given further prominence by the repeated complaints of a dancing girl to Kavi Kalash against the proceeding of a Portuguese fidalgo in converting two of her minor daughters and the refusal of the Portuguese authorities to restore them to her. To this, the ambassador was to answer that it was not the practice of the Portuguese to make any one Christian by force, and that it was against the Portuguese law to hand over to their non-Christian relatives those who of their own free will had asked for baptism and to be made Christians.⁴ If they were still not satisfied with the reply, the ambassador had to invite their attention to the fact that there was no comparison whatsoever between this action of the Portuguese and that of the Marathas in selling a large number of Christian men, women and children, whom they had taken prisoner in Bardes, some to the Dutch and some to the Arabs, the sworn enemies of Christianity. The fact seems to have been

2. *Ibid.*, p. 79. 'Lembrança que o Sr. Conde V. Rey manda fazer ao Hdo Pe. Fr. Antonio de São Joseph que vay por Embaixadora Sambaji Raze chatrapaty de algumas cousas que acrecerão de novo, depois de se lhe ter dado a Instrucção dos negos que leva a seu cargo'.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 78 (Letter of the Viceroy to the Ambassador, dated 24th March, 1684).

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.

that Sambhaji had given the Christian prisoners to his soldiers in lieu of their wages (*mushara*), and the latter had in turn sold them to whomsoever offered to pay for them. Those in Dutch hands could however be ransomed, though this had cost the Casa de Misericordia^{4a} an enormous sum of money. But the Christians sold to the Arabs had been irretrievably lost, having been compelled to accept Islam.⁵

The issue of the alleged forced conversions however was hardly touched upon in the course of the parleys. Sambhaji had in the meanwhile found other reasons for refusing to comply with the capitulations. He alleged that Manoel Saraiva de Albuquerque, whom the Viceroy had deputed to the Maratha court to adjust the terms of the treaty, had promised that the Portuguese government would abandon the island of Anjediva^{6a}, and that the Viceroy would send to the Maratha sovereign an ambassador with a valuable present.⁶ The Viceroy was completely taken aback by this demand, and wrote to Prince Akbar,⁷ on whose intercession he had agreed to a cessation of hostilities, that he had not given such powers to the envoy; nor did Manoel Saraiva de Albuquerque, when he returned, speak to him concerning it; nor did Mahadaji Naik and his colleagues when they were at Goa. 'When I received this notice from you and Kavi Kalash,' the Viceroy went on, 'I asked Manoel Saraiva, if he had made such a promise, and he told me that it was wrong to say that he had promised to abandon Anjediva. What he had said when speaking of this, was merely, that Sambhaji had no right to it whatsoever, if the Portuguese had not, to whom it belonged of old, after whom the English occupied it, and both left it because of the many cases of sickness and death; that the reason why I had fortified it now was that the Malabarese may not take shelter in it and sally forth for committing pillage; and also because the Arabs, who are the enemies of this State wanted to occupy it in order to make themselves our neighbours; that it brought no revenue whatsoever, and that the Portuguese had already begun to complain of the inhospitable nature of the island—from which he understood that it would automatically be abandoned in less than two years.' 'The discussion having taken this form,' the Viceroy pointed out, 'it is not possible that Manoel Saraiva could have promised that the island would be abandoned. Moreover the discussion was only on the future, nor was all that was discussed in the conferences assented to, but only that which was written down and signed as terms of peace. If therefore he did not speak of leaving Anjediva, there is no room now for raising fresh doubts'. 'And as to the

4a. A charitable institution, dating from the earliest days of the Portuguese connection with Gon. The hospital which it ran was famous throughout the East, and is enthusiastically described in travel literature.

5. Piscurlencar, *loc. cit.*

6a. An island off Karwar in North Kanara.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 89-91. Viceroy's letter to Prince Akbar.

present,' the Viceroy said, 'Manoel Saraiva tells me that when Your Highness told him that it was necessary to send a delicacy to Sambhaji Raja for having concluded this treaty, he replied that I would not fail in this demonstration of friendship, but that he never gave you to understand that it would be very expensive, as you now try to make out. And indeed it is superfluous even to speak of this, when I have already sent with Mahadaji Naik a present bigger than any that have ever been sent either to Adil Shah or to Shivaji, the father of Sambhaji Raja. Moreover, sending of presents is voluntary and not obligatory, and Sambhaji Raja should be satisfied with what Mahadaji Naik has taken in fulfilment of the promise of Manoel Saraiva. Despite the fact that he has not reciprocated in this respect, I have sent him one more with the ambassador which, although less valuable, is enough to demonstrate the friendship and good will, because it was for this purpose that the presents were introduced. But once they are considered in terms of their intrinsic worth, it is understood that they are valued more on account of profit than on account of friendship and esteem for which the treaty is made.' 'And so I am persuaded,' concluded the Viceroy, 'that Anjediva and the present are merely a pretext for not observing the terms of the treaty, from which it may be inferred that when Sambhaji Raja begged for peace, through your intervention, it was not out of friendship for the Portuguese, but because by concluding peace, he wanted to prevent them from joining the Mughal Emperor, your father, who had come down from the Ghauts to the Konkan, fearing that by thus uniting their forces they would be inflicting upon him a greater loss. This is now quite clear, since the moment the army returned across the Ghauts, he has started speaking about these subjects, which are not included in the treaty, which he seeks to change with this pretext, and which, I thought, had been for ever firmly fixed.'⁸

In the fresh instructions issued to the ambassador, he was required to explain to Sambhaji and Kavi Kalash how scrupulously the Portuguese had adhered to the terms of the treaty. Recently, Shaik Muhammad, the ambassador of the Great Mughal, resident in Goa, wanted to enlist certain Dessais (warrior caste of the Konkan) in the service of Prince Muazzam Shah Alam,⁹ and with a view to taking them with their families had even paid them 8,000 xeraphins.¹⁰ When the Viceroy got wind of the negotiations, he forbade these Dessais to join the Mughal service, and stopped their embarkation, knowing how useful they would prove to the Mughal in facilitating the conquest of the Maratha territories in the Konkan. The Dessais had thereupon

8. *Ibid.*

9. The eldest son of Aurangzeb, who on succeeding Aurangzeb as Emperor assumed the style of Bahadur Shah.

10. An Indo-Portuguese coin of the value of a shilling and six pence, i.e., a rupee.

to make good the amount they had received from the Mughal ambassador, and they were hard put to it to do so, since they had already spent the money. The Viceroy required his ambassador to represent this matter to the Maratha court, and see that they were reimbursed, and also procure pardon to such of them as had taken up arms against the Marathas, as had already been determined upon in the capitulations. The Maratha Government was to be requested to give them safe conduct and consign them their pay so that they may go back to their villages, as otherwise out of sheer necessity to save themselves from starvation they would secretly flee to the Mughals or join the service of some other power.¹¹

Minute instructions were issued to the ambassador as to how he should endeavour to win Prince Akbar and Kavi Kalash over to the Portuguese side. It was to be impressed upon the former that he was the real author of the treaty, because had it not been for his mediation, the Viceroy would never have agreed to come to terms with the Marathas. That being so he should do whatever would conduce to make these treaties effective. On the part of the Portuguese the ambassador was to assure the Prince of the support of the Viceroy in his bid for the Mughal throne, 'as he is a prince of such good parts and deserving of great kingdoms and empires.' This was of course what the Viceroy was going to do in the future. But care had to be taken of the living present, and so the Secretary of State sent certain delicacies to the Prince on his own account. As he wrote to the ambassador, 'In order to win the good-will of this Prince on account of our dependence on him so that he may work for this treaty, I have sent from my own house.....a few mats he had asked for.....and which I bought from a ship that came from China, besides a barrel of cheese from Alentejo^{11a} and another of vinegar from Portugal, which are things he relishes as this has been confirmed by his servants when I sent him other cheeses and vinegar.'¹²

On the other hand Kavi Kalash was to be told that the treaty was his handiwork, and the ambassador was so to work on his vanity as to convince him that 'it was absolutely necessary for his credit and reputation that it is observed, as was becoming a person so truthful and of such good heart as himself.' And as mere words were not likely to carry weight with a calculating Brahman, the ambassador was instructed to go further and promise him also a delicacy. The Portuguese had heard that the minister had been on the look-out for a nose-ring and a coral necklace for the use of his wife, and had set his eyes on a first-rate nose-ring which had been pawned in the city of Goa for 5,000 xeraphins. Accordingly the Secretary of State wrote to the ambassador, 'As soon as

11. Pissurlencar, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-81.

11a. A province of Portugal with Evora as capital.

12. Pissurlencar, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-88. Letter of the Secretary of State to the ambassador, dated 26-4-1664.

you send me word I shall buy it with the corals, which I am not sending now, since if nothing materialises after they are given, the expense will be in vain.' However, despite all this, if the Marathas were still to insist on their two points, the ambassador was instructed to withdraw to Goa.¹³

The negotiations dragged on for over five months, while the Marathas continuing the *status quo ante* kept up a constant state of warfare both in the territory of Goa and the Province of the North. Writing on the 10th of May, François Martin said that he had received news from Daman that the troops of Sambhaji were despoiling the flat country and the territories around Bassein, and that to prevent this spoliation, the Governors of these places had agreed to pay a contribution to the Marathas. According to the same source, the Viceroy had ordered his troops not to offer resistance to them, lest they should make this a pretext to renew the war.¹⁴ But Joseph de Mello e Castro, the General of the North, could not for ever be indifferent to the depredations of the Maratha soldiery. He warned them a number of times that a treaty of peace had been concluded between Sambhaji Raja and the Portuguese, and that if they persisted in their hostilities they would be treated not as subjects but as rebels against their sovereign. To this they sent answer by word of mouth that they were merely carrying out the instructions of the Peshwa and that they could not stop without his orders. At length when his patience was at an end the General gave them an ultimatum, offering them a safe conduct out of the Portuguese territory. But far from giving heed to the warning, the Marathas killed the messengers who bore the message. Incensed by this affront, Joseph de Mello took the field personally against the enemy, and forcibly ejected them from the Portuguese territory.¹⁵

The incident naturally aggravated matters at the Maratha court, where Kavi Kalash was apparently trying for an accommodation, and gave the upperhand to the Peshwa, who was bent on undoing the peace, negotiated mainly through the efforts of his personal enemy and rival. Kavi Kalash, therefore, wrote to the General of the North requesting that his armies be withdrawn immediately. But knowing, as he did, the temper of the Marathas, which might burst into flame at any moment, necessitating similar action in the future, he advised him that on such occasions he should not himself go forward leading his men, but rather leave the matter to his subordinates. For if the General personally took the field, the incident would be magnified out of all proportion as a

13. *Ibid.*, p. 87.

14. Martineau, *Mémoire de François Martin (1665-1694)*, vol. II, p. 349.

15. Pisurlencar, *op. cit.*, pp. 94, 95-96. Letter of Joseph de Mello e Castro to the ambassador, dated 19-4-1684, and reply of Joseph de Mello to Kavi Kalash, dated 16-6-1684.

result of differences between the two states and afford reason for breaking the treaty. He also assured him that he had written to Keshav Pant, the Maratha commander, not to molest the territories, hills and forts under the jurisdiction of the General, as he had been doing.¹⁶

In his reply to Kavi Kalash Joseph de Mello e Castro explained the circumstances under which he had been forced to lead his troops. He had sent one of his captains to Cassabe and another to the hill of Caranja, and when in the encounter that followed there were losses on both sides, he had to march personally to the assistance of his men. He admitted that he had done this as his patience had been exhausted 'on account of the outrages committed by Keshav Pant since the conclusion of the treaty to which he has paid scant respect.' At the very instant when the letter of Kavi Kalash reached the General, and he was ordering his men to retreat and have friendly dealings with Sambhaji's troops, Keshav Pant was hindering the Kunbi cultivators from sowing, demanding from each field (arada) five rupees. In conclusion the General requested Kavi Kalash that he should forthwith order the withdrawal of the Maratha soldiery, put an end to the extortion, and compel Keshav Pant to restore the plunder he had taken from the Portuguese territories since the conclusion of the treaty. In cash alone this plunder would amount to 400,000 pardaos, not to speak of the cattle, paddy, timber and salt which he had carried in large quantities in addition to what he extorted from the people, which had not yet been correctly estimated.¹⁷

The endeavours of Kavi Kalash however were of no avail, and the Maratha incursions into the Province of the North continued throughout the months of June, July and August, while already on the 17th of July they had plundered the villages of Curtorim, Assonora, Revora and Pirna in the Goa territory.¹⁸ Although Sambhaji disavowed all responsibility for the action of his vassals, and the Viceroy on his part preferred to take no cognizance of the provocations, the ambassador felt that it was no use prolonging his stay at the Maratha court under these circumstances. Before leaving, however, he got Kavi Kalash to sign a document with him on the 6th of September 1684, which stated *inter alia* that while there was no disagreement between the parties as to the interpretation of the points of the capitulations, doubts having arisen on two amendments, which the terms of his appointment did not empower him to resolve, over and above what had been said on them by the Viceroy, the Secretary of State and Manoel Saraiva de Albuquerque,¹⁹ it

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 94-95. Letter of Kavi Kalash to the General of the North received on the 16-6-1684.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 94-97. Dated 16-6-1684.

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.* Piquierencar, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

was agreed between them that Sambhaji should send his ambassadors to treat of these matters with the Viceroy, and there should be suspension of hostilities till the return of these ambassadors to Raicee with the reply of the Viceroy.²⁰

The failure of Father Antonio's mission, however, convinced the Viceroy that Sambhaji was not disposed to observe the terms of the capitulations. He therefore opened negotiations with the Dessais of the Konkan and in particular with Khem Savant of Kudal, inciting them to rebel in a body against the oppressive rule of the Marathas, and so to annex the coastal tract between Chaul and Goa. After prolonged discussions when at length the Viceroy had solemnly pledged not to treat separately with the Marathas, and the Dessais had agreed on their part to leave at Goa as a hostage a person acceptable to the Viceroy, a compact was signed between the parties on the 8th of February, 1685. Under its terms the Portuguese agreed to supply the Dessais with powder and shot free of charge and to assist them with the co-operation of their fleet along the whole length of the coast. Of the territory conquered, two-thirds was to go to the Portuguese and one-third to the Dessais in South Konkan and *vice versa* in the north. The Viceroy undertook to use his good offices to find suitable employment for the Dessais in the Mughal armies after the conclusion of the war with Sambhaji and promised not to interfere with their religious practices in their home districts.²¹

When these negotiations had entered the penultimate stage, the ambassadors of Sambhaji made their appearance at Goa. They were coldly received by the Viceroy,²² and on the conclusion of the pact with the Dessais they found themselves close prisoners in the very apartments that had been assigned for their use, with sentries posted round the building to prevent their escape. As Rangaji Lakshmidhar,²³ one of these ambassadors, wrote to Father Antonio on the 18th May, bitterly complaining against the treatment: 'We have to be like jogues without shaving, as we cannot get out'; and contrasting the treatment of the Portuguese ambassador by the Marathas: 'Neither the King Chhatrapati (my lord) till the present, nor his father the Maharaja (who is with God), when he was living, ever offended by breaking the word and safe conduct given by their ministers, subedars and havaldars even to traitors and rebels.....and chiefly the word given through the instrumentality

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 92-97.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 102-103. The terms of agreement between the Count of Alvor Viceroy and Captain General of the State of India and Rama Dalvy, Deva Saunto and other vassals of Sambhaji, dated 8-2-1685.

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 97-98. The ambassadors wanted that the Viceroy should receive them on the 2nd of the January, but the Viceroy refused to receive them before the departure of the ship to Portugal, as he was busy with official correspondence.

23. Lakshmidhar was conversant with Portuguese. The other was Sidoji Farzand.

of an ambassador, which must be kept as law.....Since the time we came here, we have been suffering, and it is not possible for us to endure any longer its rigour. Nor are we prisoners that each of us should be confined to a cell. What with dangers of sickness (from which God may preserve us) we are passing our days in anxiety. For if something happens, we shall die like captives. We have no liberty to go to the other side; and I see no reason or diplomacy in having those sentinels...unless it is intended that we should be killed by them. Allow us to walk freely, and we shall remain in the city so long as it pleases His Excellency. But we are without money to give to our servants and palanquin-bearers, and there is no money coming from the other side.'²⁴

In the meanwhile, however, the Dessais had already declared war against Sambhaji. Giving an account of the rebellion to the court, the Viceroy observed on the 24th January, 1686: 'These men then declared war on the 12th of the same month (February)²⁵ and spreading themselves in different parts, extorted huge sums. They were supported in their hostilities by our armada on the north coast, which I sent for blockading the river of Vingurla. As a result, the enemy was prevented from receiving any succour by way of the sea. Finally there descended from the Ghauts a posse of the enemy's cavalry to repair the ruin inflicted on his territories. With its arrival, the hostilities were suspended for a few days. But our confederates immediately resumed their activities on realising the embarrassment caused to the enemy's troops and when they knew that they had nothing to fear. The losses which these negroes have inflicted on Sambhaji are incredible. They have not yet accomplished half of what they could, and this being the state of things, it will not be surprising, if they will make themselves masters of the whole of the Konkan. Nevertheless, though slack, they carry on as lords of the field, and they wage that manner of war (guerilla warfare) which, if it is not enough for the conquest of the fortresses, is sufficient for the ruin of the territories, in which this prince (Sambhaji) takes little interest, so that of all he had, he retains today hardly anything besides Ponda, and even this not by any effort of his own. Distracted by these and other troubles, Sambhaji's power is confined only to the north.'²⁶

When the Dessais were thus causing havoc in the Maratha territories along the Konkan tract, the Portuguese overran Chaul, Banda and Bicholim then under Maratha occupation, and took prisoner their administrative officers. The Viceroy also instructed Joseph de Mello e Castro to eject the Marathas from some of the places which they had occupied in Bassein. The General promptly carried out the instructions,

24. Pimurlencar, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-102. There is also another letter of Lakshmi-dhar dated 11-4-1685, *op. cit.*, pp. 99-101.

25. 1685.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 106, 105.

and in a short time drove the enemy from the hills of Guidiana, Cammandurga, and Chandavari. And finally with the fall of the almost inaccessible hill fastness of Asserim in October 1687, the Marathas were completely expelled from the Northern Province.²⁶

In the period that followed Sambhaji was busy eluding the relentless pursuit of his mortal enemy Aurangzeb, and his tragic end in February 1689 left the Portuguese for the moment secure from the aggression of the Marathas. True, the Portuguese were not able to achieve their object in annexing the part of the Konkan under Maratha occupation. But disgusted as they were with Sambhaji, they considered it a mercy to be rid of his vicinity. Reporting on the situation to the Portuguese Crown the Viceroy observed in January 1689: 'We are free from the (perilous) neighbourhood of the robber Sambhaji, because the Mughal has taken all his Konkan and the celebrated city of Ponda, close to Goa; indeed had he been given a free hand, in a few years' time he would have destroyed everything.'²⁷ Khem Sawant and the Dessais had in the meanwhile enlisted themselves in the Mughal army at the invitation of the Mughal General Bahadur Khan in the hope that the Mughals would restore to them their lands in the Konkan.²⁸

26. *Ibid.*, p. 103.

27. Branganca-Pereira, *Arquivo Português Oriental*, tomo I, vol. III, pt. I, p. clxviii.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 285-86. Resolution passed at the meeting of the Council of State on the 18th August 1688, and the permission of the Viceroy, 27th September, 1688.

* The deliverance of Goa from Sambhaji was attributed by common consent to the intervention of St. Francis Xavier, and this belief has persisted through the centuries to our own day. Conde de Alvor had recourse to the Saint, when left scarcely with any resources to defend the city he found to his consternation that the Marathas, who were converging on the island of St. João, would soon force their entry into the city from this adjacent island, and all would then be over for the Portuguese. In his celebrated work *Oriente Conquistado* (which gives the history of the missions of the Society of Jesus in the East) Fr. Francisco de Souza describes the scene, of which he was himself an eye-witness, when accompanied by the members of the Professed House of the Jesuits the Viceroy proceeded to the shrine of the Saint and having recited the litanies, the antiphons and the prayer to the Saint, they all flagellated themselves as a mark of penance. The torches were then lighted and the tomb of the Saint, wherein his incorruptible body lies, was opened, and the Viceroy placed into the hands of the Saint the staff and the Royal Patent together with a document which he had himself drawn up. In this document he committed the government of the State in the name of His Serene Highness of Portugal to the care of the Saint 'so that he may preserve and defend it with his miraculous protection.' When lo and behold there descended from the Ghauts a mighty Mughal force under the command of the eldest son of Aurangzeb. 'This was the succour,' observes Fr. De Souza, 'which Xavier sent us for clearing the land of the Concanis of Samba, and goes on to add that 'these latter forthwith sent on the 3rd of January four ambassadors to Daungim in order to treat with us, (promising) to give public satisfaction for the late war and suing for peace.' Indeed in the hopelessly perilous situation in which Goa was placed it was only the fortuitous circumstance of the appearance of the Mughal host that could have prevented it from falling into the hands of the enemy. In concluding his account of the incident Fr. De Souza remarks: 'I do not propose to examine whether the circumstance was miraculous or was the result of purely natural causes. I only say that the preservation of the State was then attributed with one voice, and is still attributed to this day (i.e., some years later when he was writing his work), to a miracle.' (*Oriente Conquistado*, c. IV, d. I, paras 107-108)

Here I wish to acknowledge, as is the common custom among Christians, my own indebtedness to the Saint and Apostle for an instantaneous cure through his intercession of a dangerous heart ailment from which I was suffering for some time. It was in 1957 when I was in the extremity of my misfortunes and was beginning to feel that I was about to be overtaken by a fatality that I wrote to Mgr. Gregorio Magno Antão, the ecclesiastical historian of Goa and Chancellor of the Archdiocese, requesting him to have a Mass offered in expiation at the tomb of St. Francis Xavier. It was extremely kind of my esteemed friend that he took the trouble of himself going all the way to Old Goa for the purpose. The Mass was said without my knowledge on the 2nd April 1957, and I was cured at that very instant in Bombay, of the ailment, which was threatening to take an ugly turn, without a drop of medicine, to the pleasant surprise of my esteemed physician-friend here Dr. Damascene Ferreira, who had once treated me for it. In October of that year I took my students on an excursion, among other places, to Deogiri, near Aurangabad, and I was among the first to reach the top of the hill-fort. Other expeditions followed, and I have repeated the feat with ease.